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FOREWORD: ALTRUISM, COMMUNITY, 
AND MARKETS 
KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC*, JULIA D. MAHONEY** & SALLY L. SATEL*** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
From the nineteenth century until the final decades of the twentieth, the 
notion that Adam Smith’s two leading works—The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
and The Wealth of Nations—stood in opposition to one another was widespread.1 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments2 depicts a civil society in which human conduct 
is grounded in sympathy, while the market economy portrayed in The Wealth of 
Nations3 is seemingly based on the pursuit of individual self-interest. Yet upon 
careful inspection, the two works form a coherent whole, with The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments “focusing on mankind’s inner life and the cultivation of the 
virtues that undergird the dynamic commercial society celebrated in The Wealth 
of Nations.”4 In short, both altruism and self-interest are crucial for constituting 
society. 
That human motivations can be complicated and that the concerns of 
individuals for both self and others shape communities—local, national, and 
global—are simple observations. It is much harder to grasp the complexities of a 
rapidly changing world in which human beings with their varying commitments 
continually interact. Our desire to better understand how and in what ways the 
 
Copyright © 2018 by Kimberly D. Krawiec, Julia D. Mahoney & Sally L. Satel. 
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.  
       *      Kathrine Robinson Everett Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
       **   John S. Battle Professor of Law and Class of 1963 Research Professor in Honor of Graham C. 
Lilly and Peter W. Low, University of Virginia School of Law. 
       *** MD, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Lecturer, Yale University School of 
Medicine. 
        1.    See generally Leonidas Montes, Das Adam Smith Problem: Its Origins, the Stages of the Current 
Debate, and One Implication for Our Understanding of Sympathy, 25 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 63 (2003).  
 2.  ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759).  
 3.  ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). 
 4.  Julia D. Mahoney, The Struggle for America’s “Fiscal Soul,” THE NEW RAMBLER (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/political-science/the-struggle-for-america-s-fiscal-soul 
[https://perma.cc/6X4S-XNT4]. See also Joseph Blocher & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Foreword: How to 
Think About Law and Markets, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.1, 2017, at 6 n.33 (observing that The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments “provided much of the intellectual architecture” for The Wealth of Nations); 
Ronald Coase, Adam Smith’s View of Man, 19 J. L. & ECON. 529 (1976) (detailing Adam Smith’s 
depictions of the complex motivations for human behavior); Paul G. Mahoney, Adam Smith, Prophet of 
Law and Economics, 46 J. LEGAL. STUD. 207, 221–22 (2017) (describing Adam Smith’s view of human 
nature).   
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forces of self-interest and altruism intersect—and at times collide—in the early 
twenty-first century inspired us to organize a symposium on “Altruism, 
Community, and Markets.” The proceedings of that conclave are published in 
this issue. Held in Washington, D.C. in October 2017 and sponsored by the 
American Enterprise Institute, Duke Law School, and the University of Virginia 
School of Law, the symposium brought together scholars in law, public policy, 
economics, medicine, and related fields to examine the institutions5 that promote 
and restrict market and nonmarket interactions. The group also explored how 
the powers of altruism and self-interest are (and have the potential to be) 
harnessed to create and distribute goods and services. 
The articles produced for the symposium cover a wide range of subjects and 
are of exceptional depth and intellectual ambition. All address topics of current 
importance while situating their analyses in the broader context of the 
symposium’s theme. Taken together, the articles contained in this issue provide 
a snapshot of a world grappling with the challenges of “institutionalizing”6 human 
cooperation in the face of evolving social attitudes and technological advances. 
II 
ALTRUISM, RISK, AND COMPENSATION 
One theme of the symposium was the question of risk. The degree of hazard 
and form of hazard that people should be permitted or encouraged to 
undertake—for either monetary gain or for free —engender fierce controversy.7 
The availability of compensation for non-traditional work or production, many 
fear, may spur some individuals—particularly those who are vulnerable due to 
youth, poverty, or other factors—to make choices that are self-sabotaging or that 
they regret. At the same time, bans on payments to organ donors, athletes, and 
others who incur risks while engaging in activities of social benefit can lead to 
exploitation. Of particular concern are situations in which individuals are willing 
(or even eager) to be altruistic and forego payment in order to transact with firms 
that aim to maximize the firm’s own financial returns. 
In If We Allow Football Players and Boxers to be Paid for Entertaining the 
Public, Why Don’t We Allow Kidney Donors to be Paid for Saving Lives?, Philip 
J. Cook and Kimberly D. Krawiec contrast the compensation ban on providers 
of kidneys for transplantation with the legal treatment of participants in football, 
 
 5.   Our definition of “institutions” is a broad one, encompassing the “humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interaction.” Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP., no. 1, 1991, at 97–112. 
 6.  John E. Roemer, Socialism Revised, 45 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 261, 311 (2017) (expressing support 
in principle for socialism while acknowledging an “essential” role for markets in ordering human 
societies).  
 7.  See WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS 
(Sally L. Satel ed., 2009); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden 
Exchange, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2009, at i; Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human 
Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163 (2000). 
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boxing, and other violent sports, many of whom suffer serious acute or chronic 
injury. Cook and Krawiec argue that there is a stronger case for payments to 
kidney donors than for compensating participants in violent sports, based on the 
medical risk to participants, the consent process, social justice concerns, and 
social welfare considerations. The medical risks of a professional career in 
football, boxing, and other violent sports are much greater both in the near and 
long term than the risks of donating a kidney. On the other hand, the consent and 
screening process in professional sports is not as well developed as in kidney 
donation. The social justice concerns stem from the fact that many players are 
members of minority groups and some come from impoverished backgrounds. 
Finally, the net social benefit from compensating kidney donors—namely, saving 
thousands of lives each year and reducing the suffering of 100,000 more receiving 
dialysis—far exceeds the net social benefit of entertaining the public through 
professional sports. 
Cook and Krawiec conclude that only three logically consistent positions 
follow: allow compensation for both kidney donation and for violent sports; allow 
compensation for kidney donation but not for violent sports; or allow 
compensation for neither. Current law and practice, however, is “perverse”8 in 
endorsing a fourth regime: namely, allowing compensation for participation in 
violent sports but not kidney donation. 
Beyond Gift and Bargain: Some Suggestions for Increasing Kidney Exchanges, 
by Nathan B. Oman, advances two novel proposals for alleviating the shortage of 
transplantable kidneys. Both proposals are designed to ensure that kidney donors 
achieve their own goals, which generally involve helping a family member or 
close friend rather than simply donating a kidney to a needy individual. Oman’s 
proposals build on chains of donation, an existing—and legal—practice in which 
patients with end-stage renal disease who have willing, healthy, but biologically 
unsuitable donors are paired with others in similar predicaments. Together, 
members of these pairs are ordered so as to create a chain of biologically matched 
dyads, thereby enabling all patients to receive transplants. While in theory these 
donation chains can be expanded to include numerous links, in practice this is 
difficult. That is because if the exchange of organs takes place over time rather 
than simultaneously, those among the first to donate a kidney are “exposed to 
the risk that a subsequent donor will renege on her commitment,”9 resulting in 
the target of the earlier moving donor’s altruism going without a transplant. 
Oman’s innovative approach is to attempt to extend donor chains through 
two mechanisms. The first is to permit donors to make use of standby letters of 
credit, which as Oman points out are institutional mechanisms “honed over 
 
 8.  Philip J. Cook & Kimberly D. Krawiec, If We Allow Football Players and Boxers to be Paid for 
Entertaining the Public, Why Don’t We Allow Kidney Donors to be Paid for Saving Lives?, 81 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2018, at 33.  
 9.  Nathan B. Oman, Beyond Gift and Bargain: Some Suggestions for Increasing Kidney Exchanges, 
81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2018, at 38. 
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centuries of commercial practice”10 to provide increased assurance of contractual 
performance and to insure against counter-party risk. Oman’s second initiative is 
to allow limited financial incentives for donors who agree to make undirected 
donations in cases where such undirected donations catalyze a donation chain. 
Oman argues that payments to initial donors in such extended exchanges “nest 
bargains in a network of altruistic acts and donations”11 and are thus similar to 
existing (and uncontroversial) donation chains. 
III 
MARKETS, TRANSPARENCY, AND COMMUNITY 
Although markets are powerful instruments for stoking economic growth and 
forging community ties, the spectacle of markets in operation can elicit 
discomfort or even hostility. These negative emotions may be rooted in moral 
qualms about specific market transactions, such as sales of blood products or 
paying workers extremely low wages. In addition, some may shrink from 
acknowledging the importance of markets in the distribution of goods and 
services. There are also situations in which it is rational for those engaged in 
commerce to downplay or mischaracterize their activities so as to evade legal 
duties or avoid penalties. 
Cheap Sentiment, Claire A. Hill’s contribution to the symposium, identifies 
and critiques a phenomenon that Hill defines as “having a belief that is in some 
sense self-serving, perhaps even priding oneself on that belief, but not 
acknowledging or accepting the consequences of policy based on the belief.”12 In 
Hill’s account, at the core of cheap sentiment is a determined inconsistency of 
thought. Examples of cheap sentiment include objecting to the use of cheap labor 
while buying items crafted by low-wage workers and bewailing the transplantable 
organ shortage but rejecting out of hand proposals to offer financial inducements 
to potential organ sources. Hill notes that the inconsistent beliefs and actions 
associated with cheap sentiment do not necessarily cause psychological distress 
and can in fact serve to bolster self-regard by enabling an individual to think of 
herself as caring and virtuous while doing as she pleases. 
Hill characterizes cheap sentiment as a “pathology”13 that may contravene 
John Rawls’ conception of justice and tends to protect the status quo. Cheap 
sentiment has serious detrimental consequences in that it can significantly 
impede “sound policymaking in many different spheres.”14 Especially troubling 
is the potential of cheap sentiment to “lead market approaches and solutions to 
be dismissed notwithstanding significant costs of doing so.”15 That is not to claim, 
 
 10.  Id. at 65. 
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Claire A. Hill, Cheap Sentiment, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2018, at 68. 
       13.    Id.  
       14.    Id.  
      15.    Id.  
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Hill emphasizes, that market-based approaches will in all cases be preferable to 
other options, but only that market approaches and solutions should not be 
rejected without full account being taken of the costs. 
In Moral NIMBY-ism? Understanding Societal Support for Monetary 
Compensation to Plasma Donors in Canada, Nicola Lacetera and Mario Macis 
examine legal regimes governing blood plasma, noting that while U.S. law allows 
payments to plasma providers and the establishment of for-profit plasma centers, 
most Canadian provinces do not. Because the Canadian approach of prohibiting 
compensation for plasma fails to generate an adequate plasma supply, Canada 
makes up the resulting (significant) shortfall by importing plasma from paid 
American donors. Lacetera and Macis question whether this inconsistency 
provides an example of what they term “moral NIMBY-ism,” in which an 
individual reaps the benefits of a morally controversial transaction while 
outsourcing the moral costs of engaging in problematic market behavior. 
In an effort to answer this question, Lacetera and Macis conducted a 
randomized survey experiment with a representative sample of Canadian 
residents, finding overwhelming support for compensation to plasma donors 
without regard to geographic location, with only slightly higher support for 
paying donors in the U.S. and Australia than for paying Canadian donors. Based 
on their research, Lacetera and Macis conclude that there is very little evidence 
of moral NIMBY-ism among Canadian respondents with respect to paid plasma 
donation, and urge that Canadian policymakers consider these findings when 
formulating policies governing payments for plasma donation. 
The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker Classification 
Fights, by Shu-Yi Oei, tackles what has variously been termed the “sharing 
economy,” “gig economy,” “platform economy,” “1099 economy,” and “peer-to-
peer economy.” 16 Oei observes that although “sharing economy” was once the 
dominant term, its use has decreased in part due to a growing distaste for applying 
a label intended to connote generosity and altruism to an industry that is so 
transparently commercial. Other phrases, most notably “gig economy,” have 
recently gained traction among academics and the press. Oei argues, however, 
that the terms “gig,” “platform,” and “1099” economy are also loaded with 
meaning. Specifically, these terms may signify individuals landing a one-off 
project and carry a freelance connotation, or minimize the role of intermediaries 
such as Uber in facilitating transactions. 
Oei argues that these terms appear to have slipped into popular discourse 
without much interrogation, though they are just as misleading as “sharing 
economy” and carry implications for legal areas as varied as worker classification, 
taxation, public accommodation laws, and product liability laws. Yet these terms, 
she concludes, are potentially more effective than “sharing economy” in 
exploiting legal rules and ambiguities to generate outcomes that these new 
 
      16.    Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker Classification 
Fights, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2018, at 108–09. 
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businesses desire, precisely because they are more plausible than the “sharing 
economy” label. 
IV 
THE ROAD AHEAD: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
While it is clear that all three sectors of the economy—private markets, 
government, and the nonprofit or “third” sector—contribute to social and 
economic health, determining where one ends and the others begin in addition 
to how they can best interact with each other presents profound challenges. 
In Public Programs, Private Financing, Margaret H. Lemos and Guy-Uriel 
Charles explore the relationship between the private provision of public 
resources and democratic accountability. Seeking to stimulate public discussion 
about the ramifications of increased reliance by governments on private funding 
for government objectives, Lemos and Charles note that recent years have seen 
an influx of private money into government coffers due to public-private 
partnerships and ostensibly philanthropic donations from private individuals and 
nonprofit firms. While at first blush these developments may appear to represent 
“best-of-both-worlds combinations of public capacity and private initiative,”17 
there is reason for caution. 
As Lemos and Charles observe, private financing of public projects is in 
important respects an uncomfortable fit with key assumptions about how 
government should work. That is in large part because private money can 
transform, and not just augment, what government does. Such transformation, in 
turn, can lead to the erosion of civic values and render government less 
responsive to the needs of the electorate. Public Programs, Private Financing 
expresses skepticism about the claim that the “best way to think about financing 
questions is from a utilitarian perspective,”18 and commends the value of robust 
democratic process for making hard choices about how government will collect 
and spend money. 
Dayna Bowen Matthew’s contribution to this volume, Health and Housing: 
Altruistic Medicalization of America’s Affordability Crisis, examines the problem 
of affordable housing from a public health perspective. Documenting the strong 
connection between quality housing and community health, Matthew concludes 
that market solutions in and of themselves are unlikely to satisfactorily address 
problems of shortfalls in housing supply. What is required, argues Matthew, is a 
comprehensive approach that includes the deployment of public funds to ensure 
affordable housing for all populations. Of particular importance is restructuring 
government expenditures on housing programs to devote additional resources to 
low-income families. 
 
       17.    Margaret H. Lemos & Guy-Uriel Charles, Public Programs, Private Financing, 81 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2018, at 138. 
       18.     Id. at 160. 
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In offering these policy prescriptions, Health and Housing: Altruistic 
Medicalization of America’s Affordability Crisis builds on America’s strong 
tradition of communal altruism aimed at improving the living conditions of the 
poor. At the same time, the article emphasizes the need for housing policies that 
go beyond the “selective, conditional altruism” that has historically “identified 
some but not other populations as worthy recipients of housing assistance.”19 
Such an expanded set of housing policy initiatives promises to result in an 
American population that is not just better housed but also healthier. The 
potentially enormous benefits of housing policy underscore an important 
consideration in institutional design, namely that spending on social interventions 
other than direct medical care can be a very effective strategy for improving 
public health. 
Beyond Nature? Genetic Modification and the Future of Humanity, by Julia 
D. Mahoney and Gil Siegal, details the recent technological breakthroughs that 
have moved heritable human genetic modification from the realm of science 
fiction to the cusp of reality, thereby lending urgency to questions regarding 
“when, where, how, by whom, and for what purposes these new technologies will 
be deployed.”20 Mahoney and Siegal take issue with the conventional wisdom 
that extreme caution is warranted, arguing that support for this approach is 
“rooted in flawed assumptions, including ones about how the current generation 
can best safeguard and promote the interests of future ones.”21 What is more, a 
“go very slow if at all approach” may now be infeasible as a practical matter, for 
the ease and low cost of gene editing technologies may enable scientists and 
others to evade legal prohibitions. These developments, Mahoney and Siegal 
explain, threaten to erode the power of government regulators and prominent 
nonprofit organizations to restrict the creation and dissemination of knowledge. 
Beyond Nature also pushes back against the claim that extensive public 
deliberation about the ethics of heritable genome editing must necessarily 
precede consumer access. Mahoney and Siegal endorse a different approach, one 
that entails recognizing how market activity can inform democratic deliberation 
about novel biomedical technologies. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
“Altruism, Community, and Markets,” brought together scholars in law, 
economics, public policy, and other disciplines to examine how the forces of 
altruism, community and self-interest are (and have the potential to be) 
harnessed to create and distribute goods and services. The goal was to go beyond 
 
       19.     Dayna Bowen Matthew, Health and Housing: Altruistic Medicalization of America’s 
Affordability Crisis, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2018, at 193. 
      20.     Julia D. Mahoney & Gil Siegal, Beyond Nature? Genetic Modification and the Future of 
Humanity, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2018, at 197. 
      21.     Id.  
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questions of whether particular items “belong” in the market domain and to 
analyze the institutions that promote and restrict market and nonmarket 
interactions. 
Our contributors were up to the challenge. Participants explored, for 
example, how institutions, governments, and communities can overcome deficits 
in altruism that limit the supply of bone marrow, blood products, and 
transplantable organs. Others investigated the sharing economy, controversial 
gifts to the government, affordable housing, the market’s role in guiding 
developments in genetic modification, and the hypocrisy of “cheap sentiment.” 
The “Altruism, Community, and Markets” volume examines in depth the 
legal and social frameworks that govern gifts and sales. Of particular interest are 
societal expectations regarding who should be generous and under what 
circumstances; the organizational and institutional challenges of coordinating 
altruism and community-minded behavior; and how market participation 
empowers and subordinates. 
 
